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AN UPDATE ON OPEC BEHAVIOR: 
CARTEL STABILITY UNDER FALLING PRICES 
Introduction 
Griffin's (1985) widely cited study of OPEC behavior first tested tl1e 
empirical validity of several alternative hypotheses that have been put forth 
to explain the motivations and market power of the OPEC member nations. 
Although the sample period considered by Griffin (primarily 1971:I-1983:III) 
contains both upward and downward price fluctuations, the overall trend and 
dominant expectation among oil produces and consumers over that period was 
one of steadily rising real oil prices both in the near and far term. 1 
Thus, the observed production behavior by both OPEC and non-OPEC producers 
over this period should have reflected this relatively optimistic (from the 
producers' point of view) scenario of ever higher real oil prices. 
Since the end of Griffin's sample period (1983:III) much has changed in 
the world oil markets. What was thought to be only a marginal and perhaps 
necessary downward revision in the official OPEC price level for its marker 
crude Saudi Light (34° API) from $34 per barrel to $29 per barrel on March 
14, 1983 turned out instead to be only the beginning of a prolonged price 
slide. 2 The nominal spot price for Saudi Light finally bottomed out at $7.91 
per barrel in May 1986 before rebounding to its current (Fall 1988) range of 
$15-$18 per barrel, nearly half of its earlier value during 1983. As a result, 
oil producers' price expectations have been sharply revised downward, at 
least for the foreseeable future, and have probably only been slightly affected 
by the ebb and flow of Middle East political tension and the Persian Gulf 
war between Iran and Iraq. While some doomsayers still warn that sharply 
higher oil prices could be just around the corner, most observers see little 
1 
hope for real oil prices to rebound to pre-1983 levels before the end of the 
century or bevond. 3 
Thus one could reasonably expect the largely unanticipated need to make 
significant downward revisions in future expected oil prices to have in some 
way affected the more recent production behavior of OPEC and non-OPEC countries 
alike. For the members of the OPEC cartel, the prospects of steadily dwindling 
oil revenues and shrinking residual demand for OPEC oil has come to mean that 
internal cartel discipline and adherence to at least cartel-wide production 
limits is more important than ever before, but also more difficult to enforce. 
Cheating and over- or under-production by members of a cartel is always much 
easier to live with if the revenue pie available to all is growing year by 
year. In a similar fashion, firms may find it easier, and perhaps more 
efficient, to suffer some cost overruns or permit lax monitoring of resource 
usage if their market share is on the rise and normal profits are not being 
threatened. However, as the industry in which the firm operates matures, or 
as oil prices began to flatten out or trend downward, such inefficiencies or 
cheating by cartel members cannot be so easily ignored. A shrinking pie is 
much harder to divide than a growing one. 
The empirical question addressed by the present study is to what extent 
the softening of world oil markets since 1983 has changed the behavior of 
the oil producing nations, in particular the OPEC members. Do the conclusions 
reached by Griffin regarding the validity of the various OPEC hypotheses 
still hold over this latter period of much lower expected future prices? 
Furthermore, does the data suggest problems for OPEC in maintaining cartel 
stability through the 1990s? Finally, what is the evidence regarding the 
2 
uccess of OPEC i.n enlisting the help of major non-OPEC producers such as 
~exico and Norway in supporting a supra-competitive price of oil? 
The next section briefly summarizes the competing hypotheses regarding 
OPEC behavior that were analyzed in Griffin's study. This theoretical section 
is then followed by an econometric analysis of OPEC and non-OPEC behavior 
which closely follows Griffin's original methodology to allow for direct 
comparison with his results. Implications for cartel stability and the 
cooperation of non-OPEC producers are assessed in the final section. 
II. Alternative OPEC Hypotheses 
Griffin's study assessed the empirical validity of four general types 
of OPEC production models: (1) cartel models (e.g., Pindyck (1978), Gately 
and Kyle (1977), Adelman (1982); (2) competitive models (e.g., MacAvoy (1982)); 
(3) the target revenue model (see Teece (1982), Ezzati (1976), or Cremer and 
Salehi-Isfahani (1980)); and (4) the property rights model (see Mead (1979) 
or Johany (1978)). 
Testing of the cartel models followed from the econometric estimation 
of a very simple reduced form production equation derived from the assumption 
that OPEC is the residual supplier of crude oil: 
(1) i = 1, ... , n t=l, ... ,T 
where Qit is the i th OPEC country's oil production, Pt is the real oil price 
and Q1~ is the aggregate oil production corning from the other (n-1) OPEC 
countries, all for period t. Assuming a log-linear functional form, Griffin's 
hypothesis tests considered three different variants on the general cartel 
model of equation (1): (a) a "constant market sharing" (CMS) model (where the 
elasticity of oil production with respect to price (EP) equals zero and the 
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elasticity of oil production with respect to the other OPEC countries' aggregate 
oil production ([ 0 ) equals one); (b) a "market sharing" (MS) model (where 
1); and (c) a "partial market sharing" (PMS) model (where [P 
~ 0 and [ 0 > 0). The CMS model implies that all OPEC members share 
equiproportionately in production cutbacks or increases, regardless of the 
price, while the MS model allows the price to affect the individual members' 
market shares. The PMS model further allows individual cartel members to 
respond less than proportionately to changes in their fellow members' aggregate 
production. 
Testing of the competitive model involved estimating a competitive oil 
supply curve for each OPEC country that posits current oil production to be 
a function of real price, "perceived user costs ((Uit), and current extraction 
costs (Mit)" (Griffin, pp. 955-6). Lacking direct observations on Uit and 
Mit• Griffin could only estimate a "simple log-linear specification in which 
production is a positive function of the real oil price," and test the 
hypothesis that cP > 0. 
The target revenue model states that the largely underdeveloped OPEC 
countries will deliberately limit their oil production to keep from earning 
more oil revenues than their economies can "absorb" at any one time, 
particularly since they are distrustful of foreign investments and would 
prefer having "oil in the ground" to "money in the bank." As a result, the 
country's investment needs (1ft, as limited by its absorptive capacity) dictate 
their desired or "target" level of oil revenues in each period: 
(2) 
Rearranging (2) and taking natural logarithms provides yet another simple 
log-linear specification directly amenable to hypothesis testing. The "strict" 
4 
version of the target revenue model would require that E = -1 while the 
C p -
elasticity of oil production with respect to investment needs (Er) should be 
equal to one. A milder "partial" version allows for EP < 0 and Er > 0 only. 
The property rights model was tested by estimating the coefficient on 
the percentage of total country oil production directly produced by the host 
country or its national oil company (gi), using a semi-log specification 
(since the percentage is zero in some periods) with no other explanatory 
variables. The property rights hypothesis is based on the theory of 
exhaustible resources, whereby transfer of oil production property rights 
from foreign oil companies to the host government (which is assumed to have 
a significantly lower discount rate on future revenues) would cause a one-
time jump upward in the real price path as domestic extraction was decelerated 
after expropriation. Accordingly, the sign of gi should be negative if the 
property rights hypothesis is to be validated. 
Finally, to test the proposition that the observed production behavior 
of almost any oil producing country, OPEC or non-OPEC, would be at least as 
consistent with some variant of the cartel model as with the competitive 
model, Griffin also analyzed the behavior of 11 prominent non-OPEC oil producing 
countries. For those countries, Q~~ in equation (1) was replaced with total 
OPEC production, Q~t, in effect treating each non-OPEC producer as the (n+l) th 
member of the cartel. 
III. The Econometric Analysis 
A. The Data 
The revised and updated data set for testing the various hypotheses 
about OPEC members contains quarterly and annual observations over the period 
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1971:I - 1987:IV on OPEC members' oil production in thousand barrels per day 
(mbpd) and the real oil price per barrel as measured by the "free on board" 
(FOB) cost of Saudi crude, deflated by the fixed-weight price index for the 
fixed investment component of U.S. GNP (1982 = 100). For the target revenue 
models, quarterly observations were also gathered on OPEC members' market 
exchange rates and, where available, annual observations on gross fixed capital 
formation (the proxy variable used for "desired" target revenues) . 4 As in 
Griffin's original paper, the annual investment series were converted to 
quarterly series by way of linear interpolation, using end of year figures 
as fourth quarter observations, and the resulting quarterly investment series 
were converted to real terms (1982 $) using the contemporaneous quarterly 
exchange rate and the same fixed weight price index used to deflate the oil 
price series. Annual observations on the percentage of government equity 
oil needed for the property rights model were updated through 1986, adding 
five years to Griffin's sample period of 1971 - 1981. 
For the non-OPEC countries, annual observations on oil production (in 
mbpd) and real oil price per barrel were updated through 1987, as Griffin's 
non-OPEC sample only went from 1971 - 1982. 
B. Regression Results - OPEC Countries 
Tables lA - 1D present the OLS regression results for the four basic 
model types for 11 of the 13 OPEC countries, broken down by sample period. 5 
Notice that the sample periods used for Iran and Iraq reflect Griffin's earlier 
truncations on the basis of the Iranian revolution and the beginning of the 
Persian Gulf war. Under these four econometric specifications, estimates of 
the relevant production elasticities over the sample periods used by Griffin 
differ from his results only because of the slight differences in the deflated 
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price series and minor revisions in the data mentioned above. Table 2 
summarizes the conclusions reached for the various hypothesis tests performed 
in each sample period for the OPEC countries. 
1. Cartel Models 
As can be seen in Table lA, for the cartel hypotheses my conclusions 
over the same sample period used by Griffin are largely the same as his were. 6 
The strict CMS variant is not supported, except in the case of Qatar; the 
weaker MS variant is not rejected in the cases of Iran, Libya, Nigeria and 
the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.); the PMS-I variant (£ 0 > 0 and £P ~ 0) 
can only be rejected for Iraq, Algeria and Qatar; and the PMS-II variant (c 0 
> 0 only) can only be rejected for Iraq, the only OPEC member whose estimate 
of c 0 was negative, although not statistically significant. 
Over the updated latter half of the data set (the post-Griffin periods), 
the various cartel hypotheses performed in much the same way as in the earlier 
sample; however there were some notable differences. While the PMS variants 
still had the most support, many of the individual countries' elasticity 
estimates changed considerably. This was particularly true for the only 
three countries to reject the PMS-II hypothesis: post-revolutionary Iran, 
wartime Iraq, and Nigeria, which experienced a major political upheaval and 
military coup on December 31, 1983 after widespread evidence of political 
and financial corruption. Iran's pre-revolutionary oil production averaged 
approximately 6 million bpd; after the Shah's fall, it fluctuated widely 
from 1 to 3 million bpd at first before flattening out at about 2.5 million 
bpd since mid-1982 due to Iran's war-hampered export capability. Thus, the 
econometric analysis over this constrained period of production was unable 
to identify either elasticity with any precision at all--both £ 0 and £P were 
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not statistically significant and the R2 was negative. Iraq's wartime revenue 
needs have led it to seek output maximization over this later sample period 
in spite of falling oil prices and calls for production restraint by the 
cartel. This can be clearly seen by the fact that both of Iraq's elasticity 
estimates over this period are large and negative, although only its price 
elasticity estimate is statistically significant. For Nigeria, which underwent 
a second military coup on August 27, 1985, this second sample period has, 
like Iran's, been one of relatively flat production, as they have sought to 
maintain maximal production levels whatever the price of oil or desires of 
its fellow cartel members, much like Iraq. (B, th Iraq and Nigeria have 
traditionally favored output maximization over cartel stability, and Iraq 
has never displayed a strong interest in following the cartel's directives, 
despite being a charter member.) Thus, neither of Nigeria's recent elasticity 
estimates are statistically different from O and its R2 is now also negative. 
For the other OPEC countries, only two exhibited production behavior 
over this later sample period that was consistent with the earlier period: 
Indonesia (although it experienced a substantial decline in its estimate of 
£P from .203 to .086) and Kuwait (whose price elasticity estimate also fell, 
but only by one-third); both countries' estimates of £ 0 remained essentially 
unchanged. In contrast, Algeria's average responsiveness to variations in 
the rest of the cartel's output fell by two-thirds (.787 to .262), while its 
estimated price elasticity remained small; neither result is surprising given 
Algeria's declining proven reserve base and relatively flat oil production 
profile over this later period, producing only between 600 to 685 mbpd. 
Clearly Algeria is finding itself less and less able to do much to match or 
counteract the actions of its fellow cartel members or wide swings in prices. 
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Libva, Qatar and Venezuela all showed a curious reversal from negative to 
positive price elasticity estimates, indicating their new willingness to 
curb their own output in the face of lower prices and help to support the 
cartel. In addition, Qatar's estimate of £ 0 rose by over 50 percent from 
the earl~er period to 1.449, indicating an even greater willingness to support 
the cartel-wide production declines that have occurred since 1983:III. (OPEC's 
total oil production averaged 26.6 million bpd from 1971:I - 1983:III but 
only 17.3 million bpd from 1983:IV - 1987:IV.) Thus these three OPEC members 
have apparently become somewhat better cartel members as prices have declined, 
recognizing the importance of coordinated output restriction and cooperation 
for cartel stability. 
The remaining two members in our analysis, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., 
both exhibited negative estimated price elasticities in the second sample 
period (although Saudi Arabia's is not statistically significant), after showing 
positive price elasticities for G~iffin's sample. In the case of the U.A.E., 
with little change in their positive estimate of Ea, this probably reflects 
their widely publicized rejection of their production quotas since they were 
assigned for the first time in March 1983. The U.A.E. have regularly exceeded 
their quota limits of approximately one million bpd and recently have produced 
as much as 1.78 million bpd (1987:III - IV). For Saudi Arabia, its now 
insignificant negative price elasticity is less interesting than the strong 
increase in its estimate of Ea from .607 to 1.447. (Notice that Saudi Arabia 
is now the only OPEC member whose behavior is consistent with the strict CMS 
cartel hypothesis over this later period although this is overshadowed by 
the poor fit of the model.) These results are consistent with the actions 
the Saudis took to "discipline" their fellow cartel members by more than 
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1natcl1ing their self-serving production increases as prices began to sl~p in 
1985 and early 1986. 7 Finally, one can clearly see the coordinated actions 
by three of the Gulf states often said to comprise the cartel's "core" --
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar--in the fact that all three countries' estimates 
of £ 0 were roughly equal to 1.500, although their price elasticities differ. 
2. Competitive Models 
Table lB presents the results for the competitive specification across 
the two sample periods. As Griffin found, the evidence in favor of the simple 
competitive hypothesis (EP > 0) was split in the earlier sample ueriod, although 
the values of R2 were substantially higher for the cartel model compared to 
the competitive model. This is not too surprising, since the competitive 
model is a nested restricted version of the cartel model and it is well known 
(e.g. Maddala, p. 126) that dropping an explanatory variable whose coefficient's 
t-ratio is less than (greater than) one will increase (decrease) R2 , and the 
t-ratios for £ 0 are greater than one for all but the maverick Iraq. In general, 
Griffin concluded that the OPEC members' observed production behavior was 
more consistent with the cartel specification than with the competitive one. 
The same basic conclusion holds for the later sample period considered 
here, albeit much more strongly, as the competitive hypothesis can now be 
rejected for all but Algeria, the only OPEC member to exhibit a positive and 
significant price elasticity in this specification. Adding ultimate recoverable 
oil reserves or some other resource base proxy to the competitive specification 
to measure possible user cost phenomena would certainly make for a more 
satisfying analysis of the validity of the competitive theory than the simple 
functional form tested here. However, the proven oil reserve series that 
are publicly available reflect widely varying assumptions about the amount 
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of the resource that can eventually be extracted and have been known to exhibit 
sig11ificant revisions at any time with no apparent link to changes in recovery 
technology or price. Witness the recent massive increases in estimated 
recoverable oil reserves for the U.A.E. from 33.1 billion barrels as of 1-
1-87 to 98.1 billion barrels as of 1-1-88 (Oil and Gas Journal); for Iraq 
from 47.1 billion barrels to 100.0 billion barrels; and for Iran from 48.8 
billion barrels to 92.9 billion barrels. Changes of these magnitudes in 
the face of flat or declining oil prices seem incongruous and demonstrate 
vividly the difficulties in using published recoverable reserve series as 
proxies for resource base scarcity or to provide indirect information on 
user costs. 
3. Target Revenue Models 
It was only possible to obtain updated investment series for 8 of the 
10 OPEC countries used to test the target revenue hypotheses in Griffin's 
original paper. The IMF investment series ended in 1975 for Iraq and 1981 
for Libya, and was not available at all for Qatar. For Algeria and Nigeria 
the investment series ended in 1985; for the remaining six countries the 
series ended in 1986. Nevertheless, the results of estimating the target 
revenue specification across both sample periods for these eight OPEC countries 
as seen in Table lC give a clear picture of the validity of the target revenue 
hypothesis. 
First, while the strict target revenue variant could be rejected for 
all OPEC countries in the earlier sample, it could not be rejected for Saudi 
Arabia in the later sample. Does this imply that, in recent years, Saudi 
Arabia has been so constrained by its limited ability to absorb new oil 
revenues that it has deliberately cut back on its oil production as oil prices 
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n--bounded slightly? Or that it followed rather than led the 1986 oil price 
decline and increased its own production to maintain a desired level of target 
revenues? Neither explanation seems to fit, especially since Saudi Arabia 
has not shown much reluctance to use foreign capital markets to invest any 
idle or excess oil revenues or obtain short-term funding when necessary. 8 
A more plausible explanation is that a shrinking residual demand for Saudi 
production and OPEC crude in general put downward pressure on oil prices, 
and in an effort to maintain or dampen the price decline, Saudi cut back its 
planned investment expenditures as well as its own oil output. 9 The 
implications for the estimated elasticities in the target revenue specification 
would be the same under either explanation, but the implied direction of 
causation is much different. 
The weaker partial variant of the target revenue hypothesis has no more 
validity over either sample period than did the strict variant: it is rejected 
for all 10 countries in the earlier sample and 7 out of 8 countries in the 
later sample. 10 Interestingly, another cartel "core" member, Kuwait, was 
the only OPEC country for which the partial target revenue hypothesis could 
not be rejected in the later sample. Not only was Kuwait's estimate of £ 1 
(1.058) statistically significant, it was also not statistically different 
from one, while their estimated price elasticity in the target revenue 
specification was -.484 and also statistically significant. This suggests 
that Kuwait was again following Saudi Arabia's lead in its production decisions 
by scaling back its own domestic investment "needs" to help support the cartel 
price. Overall, the explanatory power of the target revenue specification 
is lower than that of the cartel specification. 11 
12 
4. Propertv Rights Models 
Table 1D shows the OLS results of estimating the semi-log property rights 
specification over both Griffin's original sample period (1971-1981) and an 
extended sample period (1971-1986). Since this specification could only be 
estimated from annual data, the updated latter half of the extended sample 
(1982-1986) contains only 5 observations, and, for 3 countries, the explanatory 
variable (percent of government equity oil) was constant at 100% over those 
5 years. Accordingly, I chose to re-estimate the property rights model over 
the entire sample period rather than only over the updated portion as I did 
for the other three model types. 
As I have interpreted the property rights hypothesis, a country's behavior 
only supports it by exhibiting a statistically significant and negative 
coefficient on the percent of government equity oil (gi). Thus, as Table 2 
concludes, the property rights hypothesis can be rejected for all but Kuwait, 
Libya and Venezuela during the earlier sample. Over the entire sample, the 
property rights hypothesis has marginally more support, with only 6 rather 
than 8 OPEC members' behavior being inconsistent with it, as Algeria and 
Qatar join the other 3 countries just mentioned above. 
However, as Griffin noted, this simple analysis provides little real 
support for the property rights hypothesis, since a negative estimate for 
gi may reflect nothing more than the downward trend in a country's oil 
production over the sample period as its reserves are depleted or as its 
residual market share falls in an increasingly competitive world oil market. 
In fact, all of the countries whose behavior is not inconsistent with the 
property rights hypothesis have seen their average oil production rates drop 
by 30-40% over the sample while, for all but Kuwait and Venezuela, their 
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prover1 reserve s (h owever measured) ha v e fallen considerabl y. Kuwait's reser v es 
have surprisin gly l e apt from 63.9 billion barrels to 90 b i llion barrels in 
1984 while Ven ez u ela 's reser v es ha ve ste a dil y grown from 13 .9 billion barrel s 
i n 197 1 to ove r 30. 0 billion barr e l s i n 1987, reflecting the latter's a ggre ssiv e 
exploration progr a m after full nationalization in 19786. Also, the near 
constancy of th e e xplanatory variabl e for many of these countries over large 
portions of the s a mple periods makes it act much like a dummy variable and 
explains the low ex planatory power of this specification . 
In conclusion, my updating of Griffin's data set for the purpose of re-
assessing the e mpirical validity of four basic hypotheses about OPEC behavior 
during a period of much lower current and expected future prices has shown 
that the partial ma rket sharing cartel variant is still more consistent with 
recent observed OPEC production behavior than any of the alternatives. This 
is not too surprising, especially since the econometric analysis so closel y 
followed Griffin's original methodology, using OLS to estimate the same log-
linear and semi-lo g specifications. 
Among the results from the OLS estimation of the preferred cartel 
specification shown in Table lA are some rather low values for the Durbin-
Wa tson ( D. W. ) t e st statistic , especially over the earlier sample period . 
Nigeria and Qatar are the only two OPEC countries in the earlier sample for 
which the D.W. statistics were not significant at the 5 percent level. For 
five of the oth e r nine countries with significant D.W. statistics (Indonesia, 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela), the D.W. statistic was even below 
the value of R2 . In his original paper, Griffin did recognize the pos s ibilit y 
of autocorrelat e d errors and re-estimated each model assuming a first-order 
autoregressive e rror term, only to find that doing so provided no significant 
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improvement in the models' explanatory power while his basic conclusions 
were unchanged. 
In contrast, over the more recent sample period the D.W. statistics 
were not significant for eight of the eleven OPEC countries and never fell 
below R2 , only indicating rejection of the null hypothesis of no first order 
autocorrelation for Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. For the record, re-
estimation of the cartel specification for these three countries over this 
later sample period using an Ai~(l) model made virtually no difference at all 
in the estimated elasticities or their standard errors. 
However, the very low D.W. statistics seen for many of these countries 
in these OLS results in one or both sample periods could be signalling the 
presence of something other than just first-order autocorrelation. Significant 
D.W. statistics might also indicate a higher order autoregressive process, a 
moving average process or even some kind of specification error, such as 
incorrect functional form or omitted variables. Griffin implicitly realized 
this and experimented with alternative specifications by adding lagged oil 
reserves to the cartel and competitive models, trying a Koyck infinite lag 
structure in the competitive model, and substituting a trended investment 
series for lagged actual investment in the target revenue model. None of 
these variations were seen as being superior to the simple OLS log-linear 
specifications of Section II. 
In a separate paper (1988), I examine in some detail the choice of proper 
functional form and autocorrelation in modelling the production of crude oil 
by OPEC countries, following the generalized Box-Cox approach of Savin and 
White (1978). This approach allows the researcher to simultaneously test 
for both first-order autocorrelation and functional form, since as Savin and 
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White show, testing and correcting for these two phenomena separately is 
often inappropriate. Surprisingly, the OLS log-linear results presented 
here are found to be fairly robust to more general specifications, particularly 
over the 1983:IV - 1987:IV period. The only substantial differences are 
found in the price elasticity extimates over the earlier sample: six more 
OPEC countries' estimates of EP become small and satistically insignificant 
in the generalized Box-Cox specification, leaving only Iran and Iraq with 
positive and significant estimates of EP and only Kuwait with a negative and 
significant estimate of EP. In this case, using OLS to estimate simple log-
linear functional forms _appears to adequately uncover the primary 
characteristics of OPEC production behavior while allowing for relatively 
easy assessment of the validity of alternative hypotheses about OPEC's true 
nature. 
C. Regression Results - Non-OPEC Countries 
As a point of interest, Griffin also estimated the log-linear cartel 
and competitive specifications using annual data for 11 major non-OPEC oil 
producing countries over the period 1971-1982. Table 3 provides OLS estimates 
of these 2 specifications for the non-OPEC countries over the more recent 
period 1983-1987 as well as over Griffin's earlier sample for purposes of 
comparison. 
By again using a somewhat stricter interpretation of the cartel and 
competitive hypotheses than Griffin did, we see in Table 4 that we can reject 
the CMS cartel hypothesis for all 11 non-OPEC countries over the 1971-82 
period, as none of them displayed estimates of Eo that were not statistically 
different from one while also having an estimate of EP that was not 
statistically significant. However, over this earlier period the MS cartel 
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variant could not be rejected for China or Norway, since both had statistically 
si~nificant (and positive) estimates of EP and estimates of c 0 that were not 
statistically different from one. This suggests that China and Norway, whether 
intentionally or not, did tend to vary their production in concert with the 
OPEC cartel although they were both willing to increase their oil output as 
prices rose over this period. 12 China is also the only country that supports 
either of the two weaker PMS cartel variants prior to 1983, so that fully 10 
of the non-OPEC countries exhibited production behavior that was inconsistent 
with either of those cartel hypotheses. 
Strengthening the case against non-OPEC cooperation with OPEC in favor 
of competitive fringe behavior by these 11 non-OPEC countries during Griffin's 
sample period is the conclusion that the competitive.hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for all but, strangely enough, Canada and the United States. Both 
Canada and the U.S. were found to have negative price elasticities, although 
only the U.S. estimate was statistically significant. Rather than implying 
non-competitiveness, these results probably reflect the tight federal 
regulations on oil prices in the U.S. and oil production in Canada over this 
period. 
Since oil prices began to seriously decline in the mid-1980s, th2re 
have been repeated calls by OPEC for cooperation from the major non-OPEC 
producers in helping to share the production cutbacks needed to maintain a 
monopoly price of oil. 13 If these attempts at expanding the OPEC cartel 
have had any real success, it should be reflected in the non-OPEC countries 
production behavior over the updated sample period from 1983-1987. 14 We should, 
therefore, see sympathetic non-OPEC countries' behavior beginning to more 
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closely emulate that of the OPEC members, with the cartel hypotheses finding 
more support over this later period than it did from 1971 to 1982. 
Returning to Table 3, we find that over the more recent sample period 
of 1983-1987 only two of the 11 non-OPEC oil producers have positive 
elasticities with respect to OPEC oil output (c 0 ), namely Argentina and the 
U.S.S.R., both of which had negative estimates of c 0 over the earlier period. 
In contrast, the estimates of c 0 were positive as implied by the cartel 
hypothesis for 4 of these 11 producers in the earlier period. 15 Thus 9 out 
of 11 non-OPEC major oil producers have, since 1983, demonstrated a clear 
willingness to counteract or take advantage of OPEC production decreases to 
increase their own market shares, rather than to assist the cartel. 
Particularly interesting are the results for three non-OPEC countries 
in this group who have openly participated in recent joint OPEC meetings and 
agreed in principle to accepting some share in production cutbacks--China, 
Mexico and Egypt. China's estimates of c 0 and cp have both changed from 
positive to negative from the earlier period as she has pushed her annual 
average oil output up by nearly one-third since 1982 to almost 2.7 million 
bpd in 1987 in spite of lower prices and OPEC's calls for restraint. Mexico 
experienced a significant decline in its estimate of c0 from -1.379 to -.388, 
yet it is still negative and significantly different from zero; their estimated 
price elasticity also fell (.598 to .102) but remains positive and significant, 
too. This is hardly the behavior of a sympathetic non-OPEC producer; only 
wartime-pressed Iraq had a worse record for cartel cooperation over this period, 
with a statistically significant estimate for c 0 of -.638, and Iraq made it 
quite clear during those years that it would ignore any production restraints 
suggested for it by its fellow OPEC members. Arab Egypt's estimate of c 0 
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was essentially unchanged at -1.008, while its estimated price elasticity 
became negative, as China's did, as it also acted to maximize its own oil 
revenues while publicly calling for greater non-OPEC cooperation to maintain 
stable prices. 
Norway is often mentioned as a promising candidate for greater cooperation 
with OPEC, and has even hinted that it is sympathetic to such joint efforts. 
Comparing its behavior from the earlier period to more recent times, we see 
that Norway has followed China's lead and begun to take advantage of OPEC 
cutbacks to increase its market share (c 0 is now negative), counteracting 
recent oil price declines with higher production levels (up by 87% since 
1982, so that cp is also now negative). The combined output of Brunei and 
Malaysia (formerly operated as one unit) has similarly changed under falling 
prices, with both estimates of c 0 and cP becoming negative, while India and 
the United Kingdom now exhibit negative price elasticities to complement 
their still negative OPEC output elasticities. Fully 7 out of these 11 non-
OPEC oil producers now have negative production elasticities with respect to 
price and OPEC output; only the U.S. did in the earlier sample. 
In sum, Table 4 shows that we can reject all but the weakest PMS-II 
cartel variant for all 11 non-OPEC countries in this later sample, failing 
to reject the PMS-II variant only for the Soviet Union, with its statistically 
significant OPEC output elasticity of .381. The competitive hypothesis can 
also be rejected for 9 of the 11 non-OPEC producers, since they do not exhibit 
the traditional positive price elasticity assumed in that model. However, 
this only demonstrates the limited applicability of the simple competitive 
specification, since they have been very aggressive in expanding their 
individual market shares. As oil prices have fallen, these non-OPEC producers 
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have stolen market share from OPEC, leaving most OPEC members with no choice 
bttt to cut their own prices to regain their market shares. This is 
unquestionably competitive behavior on both parts, indicating the difficulties 
OPEC has had controlling its own members who see their market shares and oil 
revenues being eroded away. 
IV. Implications for Cartel Stability 
The preceding econometric analysis of OPEC members' production behavior 
suggests that cartel discipline will continue to be more difficult to achieve 
as long as oil prices remain depressed. The development of new non-OPEC 
sources of supply and the greater price responsiveness of Western consumers 
have reduced OPEC's residual market share so that cartel wide cuts in oil 
production would be needed to reverse the oil price decline; no longer can 
any one member or "core" afford to bear the brunt of reductions in the demand 
for OPEC oil. Of course, such coordinated cutbacks are precisely what OPEC 
seems least able to enforce at present. 
Since the end of Griffin's sample period, we have seen Algeria and Nigeria 
become significantly less cooperative with the cartel, in large part due to 
declining reserve bases and political turmoil. Iraq has become even more 
independent than before the Iran-Iraq war, and even with the signing of the 
recent cease-fire accord, appears intent on developing and producing its oil 
reserves to the limit. 16 Iran also seeks to rebuild after its long and 
debilitating war with Iraq, and once its export capabilities are fully restored 
can be expected to seek to maximize its own oil revenues while at least publicly 
calling for higher prices. Iran's recent adherence to its assigned quota 
was undoubtedly more the result of its limited productive capabilities than 
its willingness to cooperate with the cartel. The U.A.E. have yet to show 
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tl1at thev will abide by any quota limits, and Saudi Arabia has publicly declared 
that it is unwilling to play any kind of "swing" producer role. 17 This leaves 
Indonesia, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Venezuela to absorb a more than proportional 
share of much needed cartel production cutbacks, yet these five members 
accounted for only 31.3 percent of OPEC's total output in 1987. 
Understandably then, OPEC has begun a campaign to enlist the aid of the 
non-OPEC oil producing countries in supporting a supra-competitive price of 
oil. Based upon the results presented here, the actual recent production 
behavior of the major non-OPEC oil producing countries is driven more by 
competitive self-interest than a motivation to help out the struggling OPEC 
cartel. Regardless of appearances at joint non-OPEC/OPEC strategy sessions, 
non-OPEC producers seem unwilling to do much to maintain world oil prices 
other than to urge others to cutback. Unless their behavior changes 
drastically, the non-OPEC producers should not be counted on by OPEC to make 
the difference in stabilizing the world oil market. 18 If anything, under 
falling prices OPEC may be more on their own than ever before. 
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Notes 
1. As an example, the DOE's base case oil price forecast published in February 
1983 in its Annual Energy Outlook 1982 projected a nominal oil price of 
$29 per barrel in 1985, rising to $42 by 1987 and then $59 by 1990. 
Even after inflation, their forecast assumed an average annual real 
growth rate in oil prices of over 8% from 1985 to 1990. 
2. As late as May 1984, by which time the $5 price cut by OPEC in March 
1983 had been incorporated into their projections, the DOE's Annual 
Energy Outlook 1983 base case forecast still called for nominal world 
oil prices to reach $29 by 1985 as before, but only $53 by 1990. However, 
by 1995 nominal oil prices were projected to double to $102 per barrel, 
reflecting an assumed real growth rate from 1990 to 1995 of 14.0% per 
year! Clearly, long-term future oil price expectations were still very 
high at the end of Griffin's sample period. 
3. The latest DOE forecasts (March 1988) project real world oil prices (1987 
dollars per barrel) reaching $30.76 by the year 2000 in their base case 
scenario, $24.93 in their low world oil price/high growth scenario and 
$40.19 in their high world oil price/low growth scenario. All three 
scenarios project negative annual average percent growth in real oil 
prices through 1990, but approximately 5.5 - 7.0 percent real growth each 
year from 1990 - 2000. Less optimistic forecasts for the year 2000 
have recently been made by Data Resources, Inc.--$29.00 per barrel in 
1986 dollars--and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates--$22.00 
per barrel in 1986 dollars. See the Annual Energy Outlook 1987, Table 
7, p. 28. 
4. OPEC and non-OPEC production data were updated from various issues of 
the DOE's Monthly Energy Review, as were nominal price data. Market 
exchange rates and investment data for the OPEC countries came from the 
appropriate monthly and annual issues of the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics. The 1982 fixed weight price index was taken from monthly 
issues of the Survey of Current Business published by the Commerce 
Department, and its use instead of the implicit GNP fixed investment 
deflater (1972 = 100) chosen by Griffin represents the most significant 
departure from the original data set, although the impact on the deflated 
series is minimal. A few isolated observations on price or OPEC production 
prior to 1983:IV were corrected to reflect revisions in published sources; 
however, there were substantial corrections made to the OPEC investment 
series, particularly for Kuwait, Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela. As noted 
in the text, the investment series was not complete, ending in 1985 and 
1986 for most countries and earlier for Libya (1981) and Iraq (1975). 
The percent of government equity oil produced each year in the OPEC 
countries was found in the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. 
5. Gabon and Ecuador are again excluded from the analysis due to data 
limitations and their relatively insignificant contributions to cartel 
output. Pooling the two sample periods was considered but rejected. 
The obligatory pretests for the equality of error variances indicated 
that Chow tests could only be performed for Nigeria, Qatar and the U.A.E., 
and for all three countries the null hypothesis of stable coefficients 
and for all three countries the null hypothesis of stable coefficients 
could be rejected at the 1 percent error level. 
G. My conclusions regarding the validity of the various hypotheses about 
OPEC behavior differ from those reached by Griffin over the same sample 
period for several reasons. For example, Griffin (Table 2, p. 958) 
does not reject the CMS model (c 0 = 1, cP = 0) for Qatar, since its 
estimate of c 0 is not statistically different from 1 while its estimate 
of cP is not statistically different from 0. However, Griffin then 
concludes that the alternative MS model (c 0 = 1, cP ~ 0) also cannot be 
rejected for Qatar (p. 957), as well as the PMS model (c 0 > 0, cP ~ 0), 
although both of these cartel hypotheses require a statistically 
significant price elasticity. As presented in the text (p. 955) the 
only difference between the CMS and MS cartel hypotheses is in their 
opposing assumption about the price elasticity--the former requires 
that cP = 0 while the latter requires that cp ~ O; one cannot fail to 
reject both hypotheses in a classical two-sided test. With estimates 
of cP in the cartel specification that varied from being statistically 
significant and positive (Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Iraq, Iran, Nigeria and 
Indonesia) to statistically significant and negative ((Kuwait, Libya and 
Venezuela) to statistically insignificant (Qatar and Algeria), Griffin's 
conclusion to fail to reject the PMS hypothesis for all eleven OPEC 
countries must have implicitly required only that c 0 not be negative 
and statistically significant, with no restrictions on cP. In what 
follows, such a weaker variation (c 0 > 0 only) on the originally stated 
PMS hypothesis (hereinafter PMS-I) will be referred to as PMS-II and 
considered along with the other cartel hypotheses listed in section II. 
It further appears that Griffin's conclusions about the estimated values 
of c 0 for the PMS-II cartel hypothesis were based on a one-sided test of 
c 0 ~ 0 vs. c 0 < 0, rather than testing c 0 > 0 vs. c 0 s 0. This can 
also be seen in his testing of the other hypotheses of section II, where 
the maintained hypotheses he used always included the value of O in the 
set of acceptable values for the relevant parameter. The difference 
here is in what one concludes when a parameter estimate is not 
statistically different from O; should such a result support the maintained 
hypothesis? Griffin's rule was to conclude that it supports it; mine 
is to conclude that it does not. 
7. At the time of this writing (October 1988), the Saudis appear to be 
repeating this painful lesson as they have significantly boosted their 
output in recent weeks with the stated goal of restoring cartel discipline. 
(See "OPEC Output Jumps to Highest Since '86, Spurred by Saudi Increase; 
Oil Prices Fall," The Wall Street Journal, September 30, 1988, p. 3.) 
8. The significant involvement by OPEC member nations in the international 
financial system, which contradicts the crucial assumption of the target 
revenue hypothesis of preferring to hold "oil in the ground," has been 
analyzed in some detail by Richard Mattione (1985). Mattione found 
that across all the OPEC countries, current account surpluses of nearly 
$400 billion were invested abroad over the period 1974-83. 
9. By drawing on its capital reserves, Saudi Arabia cut its planned domestic 
expenditures by only one-third from 1981-1985 in the face of a 75% 
growth rate for the non-oil sectors of its economy from 7 to 3 percent. 
Further, total planned expenditures over the period 1985-1990 were reduced 
by 30 percent. For a complete discussion, see OPEC, Its Member States 
and the World Energy Market (1986), pp. 285-6. 
10. Notice once again that I test (£ 1 > 0 and £P < 0) vs. (£ 1 s O and£ ~ 
0) for the partial target revenue variant while Griffin tested (£ 1 ~ O 
and £P s 0) vs. (£ 1 < 0 and £P > 0) in his study. 
11. The relative inability of the target revenue specification to yield 
statistically significant elasticity estimates may be in large part 
due to the high collinearity between the explanatory variables. Sample 
correlation coefficients between the lagged investment and price series 
varied from +0.61 for Indonesia to +0.89 for Libya over the sample periods. 
12. One should realize that both of these countries went from being rather 
insignificant oil producers to major contributors to non-OPEC oil output 
over this earlier time period as oil prices rose to make such new sources 
profitable to operate. China's average annual oil production rose from 
532 mbpd in 1971 to 2,045 mbpd by 1982 while Norway's rocketed from a 
mere 5 mbpd in 1971 to 520 mbpd in 1982 as its North Sea reserves came 
into play. Thus, their unusually rapid rises in oil production over 
this period are more likely to reflect self-interested wealth-maximizing 
behavior over this period than intentional cooperation with the OPEC 
members, in spite of what the regression results imply. The results 
for the next 5 years, discussed below, agree with this interpretation. 
13. These calls culminated in an unprecedented joint meeting in April 1988 
between the 13 OPEC countries and seven non-OPEC oil producing countries 
in an attempt to agree to shared production cutbacks to prop up world 
oil prices. The seven non-OPEC attendees included China, Mexico, Egypt, 
Malaysia, Oman, Angola and Colombia. Some OPEC representatives also 
made it clear that they would welcome the additional presence of other 
major non-OPEC producers such as the U.S.S.R., Norway and Brunei at 
such joint meetings. ("Oil Producers Near Coordinated Output But Cuts 
May Be Less Than Anticipated," The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 1988, 
p. 8.) 
14. For example, Mexico was praised by OPEC's president for voluntarily 
holding its oil exports to 1.5 million bpd from mid-1983 through mid-
1984. ("OPEC to Ask Nigeria to Ease Pressure for Larger Share of 
Production Quota," The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1984, p.4.) 
15. The estimates of £ 0 in the later sample period are generally less precise 
than in the earlier period, reflecting the small number of degrees of 
freedom with only 5 annual observations. I doubt that re-estimation 
with quarterly or monthly data, where available, would affect these 
results very much. 
16. This prospect is mentioned in a recent front-page article in The Wall 
Street Journal on August 26, 1988 entitled "Iraq Moves Up Fast as a 
Petroleum Power With Huge Reserves." 
17. "Saudi Arabia Rules Out Role as Guardian of OPEC Policy, Cartel 'Swing 
Producer'," The Wall Street Journal, September 14, 1987, p.3. 
18. This is clearly demonstrated by the recent dispute between OPEC and 
non-OPEC producers on who should cut their oil exports first ("OPEC, 
Non-Cartel Producers Do a Dance Over Who Should Begin Oil Output Cuts," 
The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1988, p.43). The non-OPEC nations 
are insisting that OPEC return to its own quotas before they help out 
with a 5% cut that many see as "too little, too late." 
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Table lA - Comparison of OLS Log-Linear Results for OPEC Countries 
Across Sample Periods: Cartel Modela 
1971:I - 1983:III 1983:IV 1987:IV 
Country co [p Rz D.W. co [p Rz 
Algeria . 787 .013 .703 .978 .262 .094 .441 
( . 07) ( . 02) ( . 12) (. 03) 
Indonesia .420 .203 .805 .439 .418 .086 .365 
(. 06) (. 01) (. 14) (. 03) 
Iranb .868 .043 .700 .918 - . 061 - . 036 - . 052 
( . 15) (. 01) (.25) (.15) 
Iraqc 
-.170 .258 .592 . 969 - . 638 -.641 .575 
(. 43) (. 03) (.39) (.14) 
Kuwait 1.472 - . 297 .833 .812 1.491 -.187 .769 
(. 14) (. 03) (.28) (. 06) 
Libya .863 -.201 .535 .522 .629 .126 .313 
( . 19) (.04) (. 24) (.05) 
Nigeria 1.125 .089 .700 1. 517 .Oll - . 031 -.129 
(.10) (. 02) (.36) (. 08) 
Qatar .920 - . 019 . 718 1. 397 1.449 .286 .462 
(. 09) (. 02) (. 42) (. 09) 
Saudi Arabia.607 .230 .516 .450 1.447 - . 003 .036 
( . 12) (. 03) (1.01) (.16) 
U.A.E. . 9ll .158 . 771 .857 .825 -.207 .524 
(. 08) (. 02) (.35) ( .07) 
Venezuela . 273 -.198 . 724 .624 .282 .021 . 3ll 
(. 09) (.02) (. 09) (. 02) 
a Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
b Sample periods are 1971:I - 1978:III and 1978:IV - 1987:IV 
(pre- and post-revolution). 
C Sample periods are 1971:I - 1980:III and 1980:IV - 1987:IV 
(pre- and during Persian Gulf War). 
D.W. 
1. 551 
1.289 
1. 183 
.946 
2. 673 
1. 537 
1. 824 
1.670 
. 731 
.689 
1. 463 
Table lB - Comparison of OLS Log-Linear Results for OPEC Countcies 
Across Sample Periods: Competitive Model 8 
1971: I - 1983:III 1983:IV - 1987:IV 
Country [p Rz D.W. [p Rz 
Algeria - . 031 .005 .343 .072 .285 
( . 03) (.03) 
Indonesia .175 .639 .276 .049 .048 
(. 02) (.04) 
Iranb .077 .365 .694 - . 053 - . 024 
( . 02) (. 13) 
Iraqc .255 .601 .941 -.745 .548 
(. 03) (. 13) 
Kuwait - . 339 .470 .295 -.278 .347 
(. 05) (. 09) 
Libya -.235 .338 .439 .072 .036 
(. 05) (. 06) 
Nigeria .022 -.014 .520 - . 032 - . 053 
(. 04) ( .07) 
Qatar - . 068 .067 .465 .168 .079 
(. 03) ( .11) 
Saudi Arabia .147 .268 . 277 - .105 - . 031 
(. 03) (. 15) 
U.A.E. .100 .157 .240 -.258 .376 
( . 03) (. 08) 
Venezuela -.208 . 672 . 573 - . 003 - . 066 
(.02) (. 02) 
a Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
b Sample periods are 1971:I - 1978:III and 1978:IV - 1987:IV 
(pre- and post-revolution). 
Sample periods are 1971:I - 1980:III and 1980:IV - 1987:IV 
(pre- and during Persian Gulf War). 
D.W. 
1. 732 
.935 
1.188 
.806 
1.241 
1. 877 
1. 833 
1. 215 
.761 
.741 
.980 
THble lC - Comparison of OLS Log-Linear Results for OPEC Countries 
Across Sample Periods: Target Revenue Modela 
1971:II - 1983:III 1983:IV - End of Data 
Countrv c 1 
,\lgeriad .128 
(. 11) 
Indonesiae -.009 
(. 05) 
Iranb - .009 
(. 04) 
Iraqc 
Nigeriad 
Qatar 
.226 
(. 17) 
- . 325 
( .11) 
- . 374 
(. 20) 
-.149 
( .11) 
Saudi - . 071 
Arabiae (. 06) 
U.A.E.e .072 
(. 06) 
Venezuelae - . 228 
( .07) 
[ p 
- . 113 
(. 08) 
.174 
(.04) 
.079 
(. 04) 
.022 
( . 12) 
- . 093 
( . 10) 
.061 
( .13) 
.085 
( .07) 
N.A. 
.234 
(. 09) 
.006 
( .07) 
- . 092 
(. 04) 
D.W. 
.010 .344 
.602 .288 
.294 . 729 
.293 1.184 
.523 .284 
.310 .408 
- . 004 .554 
.240 .313 
.132 .243 
. 716 .614 
a Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
-.320 
(. 72) 
.947 
(. 44) 
.931 
(. 47) 
1.058 
(.29) 
.051 
(.56) 
1. 279 
(. 91) 
.391 
(.24) 
.082 
(.042) 
- . 034 
(. 16) 
.021 
(. 03) 
.248 
(. 3 7) 
N.A. 
- .484 
(.08) 
N.A. 
- . 441 
(1. 01) 
N.A. 
-.573 
(.36) 
-.338 
(. 08) 
- . 012 
(. 03) 
b Sample periods are 1971:11 - 1978:111 and 1978:lV - 1985:lV 
(pre- and post-revolution). 
D.W. 
- . 286 2.541 
.226 1. 191 
.083 1.400 
.745 1. 063 
-.140 2.270 
.048 .902 
.810 1. 813 
.132 1.142 
j 
The only sample period available is 1971:11 - 1975:IV due to data limitations. 
Sample period ends in 1985:lV due to data limitations. 
Sample period ends in 1986:lV due to data limitations. 
Sample period ends in 1981:lV due to data limitations. 
Table 1D - Comparison of OLS Semi-Log Results for OPEC Countries 
Across Sample Periods: Property Rights Modela 
1971 - 1981 1971 - 1986 
Country gi Rz D.W. gi Rz D.W. 
Algeria .398 - . 048 1.028 -1. 322 .147 .374 
(. 54) (.70) 
Indonesia 1. 497 . 873 1.354 .807 .401 .632 
( . 18) (.24) 
Iranb .205 .747 2. 691 - . 524 .036 . 372 
(. 05) (. 42) 
Iraqc .552 .463 1. 535 .018 - .071 . 596 
(.20) (.38) 
Kuwait - . 612 .509 1.077 -.917 .447 .559 
( . 18) (. 25) 
Libya - . 569 .293 1.438 -.953 .408 .748 
( . 2 5) (.28) 
Nigeria .181 - . 003 1.449 -.166 - . 031 .629 
(. 18) (.23) 
Qatar - . 038 - . 084 1. 596 -.246 .142 .788 
(.08) ( .13) 
Saudi Arabia .614 .739 1.788 - .077 - . 064 .474 
( .11) (.25) 
U.A.E. .658 . 726 .822 .316 .060 .275 
( .13) (.23) 
Venezuela -.328 .681 1. 676 - . 428 .689 1.139 
( .07) ( .07) 
a Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
b Sample periods are 1971 - 1977 and 1971 - 1986. 
C Sample periods are 1971 - 1979 and 1971 - 1986. 
Table 2 - Summary of Hvpothesis Tests for OPEC Countries 
Across Sample Periods 
Griffin's Sample Current Sample 
~lode ls DO NOT REJECT REJECT DO NOT REJECT REJECT 
l. Cartel 
CMS 1 10 1 10 
( t:a =l, £ =0) p 
MS 4 7 4 7 
( t:a =l, t:P,.-,0) 
PMS-I 8 3 6 5 
(c 0 >0, cP?'0) 
PMS-II 10 1 8 3 
( £a >0) 
2. Competitive 5 6 1 10 
(cp >0) 
3. Target Revenue 
Strict 0 10 1 7 
(£1=1, £ =-1) p 
Partial 0 10 1 7 
(£1>0, £p <0) 
4. Property Rights 3 8 5 6 
(gi<O) 
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Table 4 - Summary of Hypothesis Tests for Non-OPEC Countries 
Across Sample Periods 
1971-82 1983-87 
DO NOT REJECT REJECT DO NOT REJECT REJECT 
0 11 0 11 
[ =0) p 
2 9 0 11 
[p ¢0) 
1 10 0 11 
[p¢0) 
1 10 1 10 
2. Competitive 9 2 2 9 
( [p >0) 
